Identity et cetera
Mar. 7th, 2012 09:52 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
foliumnondefluetTo ask if something is true or not is not a meaningful question unless it relates to our internal world and to our capacity as observers. When we say "true" we mean "exists", or "existed", or "most definitely will exist" (the sun will rise tomorrow). But existence can only be ascertained in our minds. Truth, therefore, is nothing but a state of mind. Existence is determined by observing and comparing the two (the outside and the inside, the real and the mental). This yields a picture of the world which may be closely correlated to reality – and, yet again, may not.
Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite the fact that their individual composition is different at different moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are replaced every few years. Changing one's brain (by transplantation) - also changes one's identity, even if the rest of the body remains the same.
Thus, the only thing that binds a "person" together (i.e., gives him a self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By "memory" I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It constitutes an important part of one's self-image, self-esteem, sense of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced.
What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we "pull the plug" on them so often?
It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach).
Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - don't we already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" with an established self-identity?
Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or "willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of the self.
But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and ego - determines one's personality and self-identity.
The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question with which we ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing (Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan's personality traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often influenced by Dan's social setting and by his social interactions.
It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's self. The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's self-identity.
Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient's conscious memory and thus making it "remembered".
In fact, one's self-identity may be such a background mental phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what we call "memory" and "introspection".
This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the mechanism by which one becomes aware of one's background, "always-on", and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and introspection.
We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions:
Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing a self-identity.
It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern (usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a specific self-identity.
---
In a famous experiment, students were asked to take a lemon home and to get used to it. Three days later, they were able to single out "their" lemon from a pile of rather similar ones. They seemed to have bonded. Is this the true meaning of love, bonding, coupling? Do we simply get used to other human beings, pets, or objects?
Habit forming in humans is reflexive. We change ourselves and our environment in order to attain maximum comfort and well being. It is the effort that goes into these adaptive processes that forms a habit. The habit is intended to prevent us from constant experimenting and risk taking. The greater our well being, the better we function and the longer we survive.
Actually, when we get used to something or to someone – we get used to ourselves. In the object of the habit we see a part of our history, all the time and effort we had put into it. It is an encapsulated version of our acts, intentions, emotions and reactions. It is a mirror reflecting that part in us which formed the habit in the first place. Hence, the feeling of comfort: we really feel comfortable with our own selves through the agency of our habitual objects.
Because of this, we tend to confuse habits with identity. When asked WHO they are, most people resort to communicating their habits. They describe their work, their loved ones, their pets, their hobbies, or their material possessions. Yet, surely, all of these do not constitute identity! Removing them does not change it. They are habits and they make people comfortable and relaxed. But they are not part of one's identity in the truest, deepest sense.
Still, it is this simple mechanism of deception that binds people together. A mother feels that her offspring are part of her identity because she is so used to them that her well being depends on their existence and availability. Thus, any threat to her children is perceived by her as a threat to her own Self. Her reaction is, therefore, strong and enduring and can be recurrently elicited.
The truth, of course, is that her children ARE a part of her identity in a superficial manner. Removing them will make her a different person, but only in the shallow, phenomenological sense of the word. Her deep-set, true identity will not change as a result. Children do die at times and the mother does go on living, essentially unchanged.
But what is this kernel of identity that I am referring to? This immutable entity which is who we are and what we are and which, ostensibly, is not influenced by the death of our loved ones? What can resist the breakdown of habits that die hard?
It is our personality. This elusive, loosely interconnected, interacting, pattern of reactions to our changing environment. Like the Brain, it is difficult to define or to capture. Like the Soul, many believe that it does not exist, that it is a fictitious convention.
------
In March 2006, another theory was offered by Bert de Wildt of the Medical University of Hanover in Germany. Dr. De Wildt said that he had an example of a female patient who had played internet roleplaying games for several hours a day for more than three years. 'During that time the invented characters gradually took control over the personality which had been neglected. The patient lost control of her own identity and social life,' he said. During psychoanalysis, therapists discovered that she had developed multiple personalities." "Internet roleplaying games can cause multiple personality disorder," (2006, March 13). Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 2006-MAR-13.
------
A minority of mental health professionals accepted MPD/DID as a real phenomenon during the 1980s and early 1990s. Few continue this belief today. Most professional therapists believe that it is an iatrogenic (physician induced) disorder that either does not appear naturally, or is almost non-existent.
Many therapists and investigators are skeptical about the widespread natural occurrence of true MPD. They assert that "real" MPD it as a non-existent or extremely rare phenomenon, affecting only a handful of persons in North America. They view almost all cases of diagnosed MPD as having been artificially created by an iatrogenic (physician induced) process. That is, it created by a therapist and their client/patient during therapy, without either recognizing that the process exists. At the same time, skeptics are aware of the suffering of those diagnosed with MPD. They regard MPD survivors as victims of bad therapy. Their cure for MPD is to isolate the patient from the therapist and mutual support groups.
Some Roman Catholics and conservative Protestant Christians believe that the symptoms of MPD are created by multiple, indwelling demons or "unclean spirits" as mentioned frequently in the Christian Scriptures ( New Testament). The appropriate method of treatment is to exorcise the demons. They would disagree with any therapy that involves actually talking to the demons/alters.
Finally, a few individuals believe that MPD is a naturally occurring phenomenon, and unrelated to childhood abuse or creation by an iatrogenic process. As one web site describes it, MPD is a gift.
Judging by:
the increasing numbers of malpractice suits against MPD specialists,
the increasing numbers of cancellations of MPD therapists' licenses to practice,
the recent drop in membership of their professional organization, the International Society for the Study of Dissociation (ISSD),
the decreasing numbers of books on MPD/DID therapeutic methods,
the closing of all 28 MPD/DID specialist clinics in North America,
the skeptics appear to be gaining acceptance in society.
In time, MPD/DID will probably be relegated to the trash heap of mental health techniques, along with recovered memory therapy, and frontal lobotomies.
-----
Dr. Bennett Braun was one of the former leaders in the MPD/DID field. (He has since been expelled from the Illinois Psychiatric Society and the American Psychiatric Association, apparently for ethics violations.) He recommended that the therapist study each alter in depth in order to learn:
Its name, so that it can be directly addressed in the future
When and where the patient was at the time that it was created
What events caused the creation of the alter
"The duration of time that it has executive control of the body"
How it fits into the hierarchy of alters
Its function; how it contributes to the system of alters
One alter that is frequently found has the specific responsibility of harming the patient by slashing, engaging in other forms of mutilation and committing suicide.
August Piper and Harold Merskey reviewed the literature on DID and concluded that:
1. There is no proof for the claim that DID results from childhood trauma.
2. The condition cannot be reliably diagnosed.
3. Contrary to theory, DID cases in children are almost never reported.
4. Consistent evidence of blatant iatrogenesis appears in the practices of some of the disorder’s proponents.
Dr. McHugh draws a close parallel between hystero-epilepsy and MPD. He considers both to be "an iatrogenic [physician created] behavioral syndrome, promoted by suggestion, social consequences, and group loyalties. It rests on ideas about the self that obscure reality, and it responds to standard treatments." He proposed a 4 part cure:
Close the dissociation clinics throughout North America;
Spread the patients throughout the remaining psychiatric hospital wards;
Ignore the alters whenever they seem to appear;
Redirect therapy to focus on the patients' stressors that caused the original, pre-MPD, symptoms.
Since he made these suggestions, the approximately two dozen MPD clinics in North America have been closed.
Love, in all its phases and manifestations, is an addiction to the various forms of internally secreted norepinephrine. The withdrawal of romantic love has serious mental health repercussions.
------
Platonism is the position that, if there is a discrepancy between the world and my mental picture of it, then the world is doing it Wrong.
Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite the fact that their individual composition is different at different moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are replaced every few years. Changing one's brain (by transplantation) - also changes one's identity, even if the rest of the body remains the same.
Thus, the only thing that binds a "person" together (i.e., gives him a self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By "memory" I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It constitutes an important part of one's self-image, self-esteem, sense of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced.
What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we "pull the plug" on them so often?
It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach).
Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - don't we already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" with an established self-identity?
Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or "willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of the self.
But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and ego - determines one's personality and self-identity.
The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question with which we ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing (Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan's personality traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often influenced by Dan's social setting and by his social interactions.
It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's self. The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's self-identity.
Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient's conscious memory and thus making it "remembered".
In fact, one's self-identity may be such a background mental phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what we call "memory" and "introspection".
This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the mechanism by which one becomes aware of one's background, "always-on", and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and introspection.
We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions:
Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possessing a self-identity.
It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time.
It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern (usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have a specific self-identity.
---
In a famous experiment, students were asked to take a lemon home and to get used to it. Three days later, they were able to single out "their" lemon from a pile of rather similar ones. They seemed to have bonded. Is this the true meaning of love, bonding, coupling? Do we simply get used to other human beings, pets, or objects?
Habit forming in humans is reflexive. We change ourselves and our environment in order to attain maximum comfort and well being. It is the effort that goes into these adaptive processes that forms a habit. The habit is intended to prevent us from constant experimenting and risk taking. The greater our well being, the better we function and the longer we survive.
Actually, when we get used to something or to someone – we get used to ourselves. In the object of the habit we see a part of our history, all the time and effort we had put into it. It is an encapsulated version of our acts, intentions, emotions and reactions. It is a mirror reflecting that part in us which formed the habit in the first place. Hence, the feeling of comfort: we really feel comfortable with our own selves through the agency of our habitual objects.
Because of this, we tend to confuse habits with identity. When asked WHO they are, most people resort to communicating their habits. They describe their work, their loved ones, their pets, their hobbies, or their material possessions. Yet, surely, all of these do not constitute identity! Removing them does not change it. They are habits and they make people comfortable and relaxed. But they are not part of one's identity in the truest, deepest sense.
Still, it is this simple mechanism of deception that binds people together. A mother feels that her offspring are part of her identity because she is so used to them that her well being depends on their existence and availability. Thus, any threat to her children is perceived by her as a threat to her own Self. Her reaction is, therefore, strong and enduring and can be recurrently elicited.
The truth, of course, is that her children ARE a part of her identity in a superficial manner. Removing them will make her a different person, but only in the shallow, phenomenological sense of the word. Her deep-set, true identity will not change as a result. Children do die at times and the mother does go on living, essentially unchanged.
But what is this kernel of identity that I am referring to? This immutable entity which is who we are and what we are and which, ostensibly, is not influenced by the death of our loved ones? What can resist the breakdown of habits that die hard?
It is our personality. This elusive, loosely interconnected, interacting, pattern of reactions to our changing environment. Like the Brain, it is difficult to define or to capture. Like the Soul, many believe that it does not exist, that it is a fictitious convention.
------
In March 2006, another theory was offered by Bert de Wildt of the Medical University of Hanover in Germany. Dr. De Wildt said that he had an example of a female patient who had played internet roleplaying games for several hours a day for more than three years. 'During that time the invented characters gradually took control over the personality which had been neglected. The patient lost control of her own identity and social life,' he said. During psychoanalysis, therapists discovered that she had developed multiple personalities." "Internet roleplaying games can cause multiple personality disorder," (2006, March 13). Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 2006-MAR-13.
------
A minority of mental health professionals accepted MPD/DID as a real phenomenon during the 1980s and early 1990s. Few continue this belief today. Most professional therapists believe that it is an iatrogenic (physician induced) disorder that either does not appear naturally, or is almost non-existent.
Many therapists and investigators are skeptical about the widespread natural occurrence of true MPD. They assert that "real" MPD it as a non-existent or extremely rare phenomenon, affecting only a handful of persons in North America. They view almost all cases of diagnosed MPD as having been artificially created by an iatrogenic (physician induced) process. That is, it created by a therapist and their client/patient during therapy, without either recognizing that the process exists. At the same time, skeptics are aware of the suffering of those diagnosed with MPD. They regard MPD survivors as victims of bad therapy. Their cure for MPD is to isolate the patient from the therapist and mutual support groups.
Some Roman Catholics and conservative Protestant Christians believe that the symptoms of MPD are created by multiple, indwelling demons or "unclean spirits" as mentioned frequently in the Christian Scriptures ( New Testament). The appropriate method of treatment is to exorcise the demons. They would disagree with any therapy that involves actually talking to the demons/alters.
Finally, a few individuals believe that MPD is a naturally occurring phenomenon, and unrelated to childhood abuse or creation by an iatrogenic process. As one web site describes it, MPD is a gift.
Judging by:
the increasing numbers of malpractice suits against MPD specialists,
the increasing numbers of cancellations of MPD therapists' licenses to practice,
the recent drop in membership of their professional organization, the International Society for the Study of Dissociation (ISSD),
the decreasing numbers of books on MPD/DID therapeutic methods,
the closing of all 28 MPD/DID specialist clinics in North America,
the skeptics appear to be gaining acceptance in society.
In time, MPD/DID will probably be relegated to the trash heap of mental health techniques, along with recovered memory therapy, and frontal lobotomies.
-----
Dr. Bennett Braun was one of the former leaders in the MPD/DID field. (He has since been expelled from the Illinois Psychiatric Society and the American Psychiatric Association, apparently for ethics violations.) He recommended that the therapist study each alter in depth in order to learn:
Its name, so that it can be directly addressed in the future
When and where the patient was at the time that it was created
What events caused the creation of the alter
"The duration of time that it has executive control of the body"
How it fits into the hierarchy of alters
Its function; how it contributes to the system of alters
One alter that is frequently found has the specific responsibility of harming the patient by slashing, engaging in other forms of mutilation and committing suicide.
August Piper and Harold Merskey reviewed the literature on DID and concluded that:
1. There is no proof for the claim that DID results from childhood trauma.
2. The condition cannot be reliably diagnosed.
3. Contrary to theory, DID cases in children are almost never reported.
4. Consistent evidence of blatant iatrogenesis appears in the practices of some of the disorder’s proponents.
Dr. McHugh draws a close parallel between hystero-epilepsy and MPD. He considers both to be "an iatrogenic [physician created] behavioral syndrome, promoted by suggestion, social consequences, and group loyalties. It rests on ideas about the self that obscure reality, and it responds to standard treatments." He proposed a 4 part cure:
Close the dissociation clinics throughout North America;
Spread the patients throughout the remaining psychiatric hospital wards;
Ignore the alters whenever they seem to appear;
Redirect therapy to focus on the patients' stressors that caused the original, pre-MPD, symptoms.
Since he made these suggestions, the approximately two dozen MPD clinics in North America have been closed.
Love, in all its phases and manifestations, is an addiction to the various forms of internally secreted norepinephrine. The withdrawal of romantic love has serious mental health repercussions.
------
Platonism is the position that, if there is a discrepancy between the world and my mental picture of it, then the world is doing it Wrong.
